The ongoing United States-Israel-Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where 20 per cent of world’s petroleum supplies sail through every day, has precipitated the interest about the dire risks of closing of critical maritime chokepoints.

The United States, at one stage of its campaign, even floated the idea of utilising U.S. Marines to capture littoral points in the vital strait to force the Iranian blockade.

In the wake of developments involving the Strait of Hormuz, an Indonesian minister raised the possibility of imposing charges for vessels using the strategically important Strait of Melaka, prompting discussion in the region. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

Strategic relevance of maritime choke points

The strategic relevance of maritime choke points has remained a constant throughout military history. Their control has often defined the outcomes of major conflicts, shaped geopolitical balances, and influenced global economic flows.

Geographically, the Strait of Melaka straddles the western coastline of Peninsular Malaysia and is a strategically important maritime lifeline for Malaysia. The threat of a foreign power attempting to control the strait during a conflict must be seriously assessed, and strategies refined to deter or dissuade such a move.

Today, the strategic calculus surrounding the importance of controlling maritime choke points remains unchanged.

In Southeast Asia, the Strait of Melaka remains one of the world’s most critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Any future conflict involving major powers in the region, particularly China and Taiwan, and potentially the United States, could have significant implications for the security and stability of this vital maritime chokepoint.

Maritime choke points are narrow sea lanes that funnel international shipping through constrained passages, often bordered by the sovereign territories of multiple states. These passages, while enabling global trade, are also potential flashpoints in times of tension or conflict. Due to their geographic and economic value, they are vulnerable to interdiction, blockade, or militarisation.

Conduit for oil, liquefied natural gas and manufactured goods

In the Southeast Asian context, the Strait of Melaka may be considered as the region’s most significant choke point due to its proximity to major regional and extra-regional economies, and a major sea route for the transportation of energy and goods.

The Strait of Melaka, which spans approximately 800 kilometres and ranges in width from 2.7 kilometres to 250 kilometres, serves as the principal maritime corridor linking the Indian Ocean to the Pacific via the South China Sea. Bordered by Peninsular Malaysia to the east and the Indonesian island of Sumatra to the west, it has historically served as a geopolitical magnet, drawing the ambitions of colonial powers such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.

It is estimated that over 90,000 merchant vessels pass through the strait annually, transporting nearly 25 per cent of global trade. Its role as a conduit for oil, liquefied natural gas, and manufactured goods underpins the economies of not just Southeast Asia but also East Asia and beyond.

As the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly contested, the possibility of armed conflict — particularly over Taiwan — could pose serious challenges for the Strait of Melaka. In such a scenario, this vital chokepoint would likely assume heightened strategic importance for the parties involved.

Cautionary lessons

The Gallipoli campaign conducted from February 1915 to January 1916 during the First World War provides cautionary lessons for us today. A joint Anglo-French-Australia-New Zealand force attempted to seize maritime control of the Dardanelles Strait, with amphibious landings to neutralise Ottoman coastal batteries and capture the commanding coastal areas along the Gallipoli Peninsula.

This would have enabled Allied naval forces to access the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus Strait, and subsequently reach the Black Sea.

The failure of this operation, marked by immense casualties, highlights not only the challenges of amphibious and littoral warfare but also the significance of such maritime corridors in determining the strategic fortunes of nations – a sobering reminder of the historical consequences when belligerents seek to control key maritime chokepoints, which includes both maritime and land features.

Plausible scenarios

There are several plausible scenarios for how the Strait of Melaka may be affected.

Firstly, the belligerents may implement blockades or maritime exclusion zones to restrict or deny access to the strait, similar to those enacted during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis or the 1982 Falklands War.

Secondly, hostile forces may conduct sea denial operations such as the mining of strategic points in the strait, the deployment of submarines for interdiction attacks, and the use of anti-ship missiles or drones to strike shipping, which may render the strait impassable.

Thirdly, the belligerents may seek to strike littoral infrastructure – such as ports, refuelling stations and bunkers – using precision long-range weapons. This would not only degrade the operational capabilities but also erode the commercial functionality of critical maritime infrastructure of affected states.

And fourthly, perhaps the highest risk for the strait, the belligerent states may attempt to capture the adjacent littoral land areas straddling the strait to ensure a total control of the waterway.

Comprehensive joint strategy

As demonstrated by the Gallipoli campaign, control of the sea is often inextricably linked to control of adjacent land. The seizure or neutralisation of littoral territory enables denial of maritime access and facilitates dominance over key sea routes.

The littoral zones of Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra, and Singapore could become prime targets for temporary strategic occupation or permanent occupation of the land captured. While the littoral states may declare neutral stances, it must be underpinned by credible military deterrence and the capacity to fight for control of respective territorial areas.

Strategic prudence demands Malaysia to prepare for worst-case scenarios. The unpredictability of future conflicts reinforces the necessity for prudent foresight and decisive investments in multi-domain defence capabilities.

As Sir Julian Corbett aptly argued, the purpose of sea power is not an end in itself, but a means to influence events on land. Corbett’s logic dictates that for Malaysia to safeguard its maritime strategic interests, especially in the Strait of Melaka, a comprehensive joint strategy including naval, land and air power, must be formed.

-- BERNAMA

Adam Leong Kok Wey, PhD, is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM) and Distinguished Fellow at the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College.