The ongoing Naval Strike Missile (NSM) debacle has generated a lot of interest and excitement in the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme.

The LCS ship-building programme was initiated in 2011, and after delays and cost overruns, the combat vessels are back on track to be delivered between the end of 2026 and mid-2029, albeit five ships will be built instead of the original six ships.

The French Gowind-class frigate was selected as the base model for the RMN LCSs and will be armed with anti-surface, anti-submarine and air defence warfare capabilities, and are capable of conducting littoral maritime security missions also.

The lead ship was officially named KD Maharaja Lela in 2017, which serves as the name of the entire class of RMN LCSs.

Norway’s recent cancellation of the NSMs for the LCSs is the first serious case of defence supplier disruption for Malaysia.

Norway argued that under its new regulations, its most sensitive weapons technology can only be exported to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members and its closest allies.

Although there were some allegations that deeper geopolitical reasons may have precipitated Norway’s decision, these allegations remain speculative at best.

Malaysia and any other country procuring weapons would have conducted their own due diligence on the reliability and political risk of the supplier country before signing any defence contracts.

Malaysia’s foreign policy posture

Reflecting on this debacle, Malaysia’s strategic prudence in diversifying its military asset acquisitions from multiple countries, although purported as a logistician’s nightmare, has been vindicated by this latest incident, in which a country cannot rely on a single country to source its defence equipment.

This is also in line with Malaysia’s neutral foreign policy posture and not reliant on any single geopolitical bloc for its defence supplies.

Malaysia has a mix of military assets procured from multiple countries such as the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, Türkiye and South Korea.

This latest episode is an isolated case and not indicative of the reliability of other countries’ trustworthiness in fulfilling defence contracts. Malaysia is not expected to shift its defence procurement policies drastically in the near-term due to this incident.

As for comments that the LCSs will not be able to operate without its NSMs and that its delivery schedule will be further delayed, this argument does not hold water when assessed in its proper strategic context.

Multi-role combat ship

The LCS is a multi-role combat ship similar to a frigate-class vessel.

The LCS is equipped with the latest technologies for air defence, surface combat and anti-submarine warfare, armed with sophisticated radars, sensors, sonar and an advanced combat management system.

The LCS is also equipped with both a towed sonar array and a hull-mounted sonar for detecting submarines.

The increasingly contested waters in Malaysia’s maritime zone require the RMN to be both capable of searching and monitoring foreign submarines operating underwater within Malaysia’s maritime waters.

The LCSs are also equipped with anti-submarine torpedoes, completing their underwater warfare suite.

For both surface and air warfare, the LCSs are equipped with advanced passive electronically scanned 3D array radar and electronic optical sensors for surface and aerial detection at long ranges.

For air defence, the LCS will be armed with Vertically-Launched MICA air defence missiles supported by a pair of close-range rapid firing MSI DS30M 30mm canons and a Bofors 57mm naval gun, which also serves as the ship’s main gun for surface warfare and shelling of shore targets.

The NSM would have served as the ships’ mid-to-long range anti-ship strike capability, which following the latest incident the LCSs will be equipped with other type of missiles selected by the RMN.

Each LCS will also operate a medium lift helicopter and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) which will provide additional long-range offensive and defensive capabilities.

The helicopter typically will be optimised for anti-submarine warfare (armed with dipping sonar and torpedoes) and, when armed with anti-ship missiles, for over-the-horizon long-range strikes.

Nonetheless, even without its anti-ship missiles, the first three LCSs scheduled to be operational between the end of 2026 and late 2027 will still be able to operate in multiple naval tasks such as maritime patrol in deterring foreign nefarious actions and securing and showing presence in Malaysia’s maritime zone, anti-piracy, search-and-rescue and humanitarian assistance missions, as well as naval diplomacy tasks.

Sophisticated air defence

The LCS also complements Malaysia’s layered joint air defence systems with its sophisticated air defence radar and weapons to cover air gaps in the forward areas over Malaysia’s maritime waters.

The aforementioned advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities enable the LCSs to detect and monitor underwater activities effectively at a more sophisticated level.

With its suite of multidomain combat capabilities, the LCS is able to operate in multiple operational roles without an anti-ship missile system for the time being, while a new missile system is sourced, procured and installed later which may take anywhere between two to three years.

The new missile package may be delivered just in time to be installed in the fourth and fifth LCSs planned to be operational between late 2028 and mid-2029.

Meanwhile, the first and second LCSs, which by then would have operated for about two years, will be due back in the dock for minor repairs, routine servicing and system upgrades.

The new anti-ship missiles can be installed during this period. The third LCS will follow suit once the first two LCSs have been fully re-equipped.

Following this schedule, the RMN will have all the LCSs operating according to schedule but also fully equipped for its whole spectrum of warfare.

More importantly, the crews of the first three LCSs will have acquired valuable operational proficiency in handling the sophisticated vessels and will be able to transmit this experience, serving as training instructors and nucleus crew for the fourth and fifth LCSs.

The NSM debacle should not be viewed as a major hindrance to the RMN LCS programme, as it will serve as a potent catalyst to build a modern, well-armed, and resilient RMN.

It is another storm that the RMN needs to weather through but with a silver lining on the horizon.

There are viable options available for the LCSs to be completed and operated according to schedule. And when that happens, it will indeed be a formidable sight to see all five Maharaja Lela-class LCSs sailing in line abreast formation against the horizon.

-- BERNAMA

Dr Adam Leong Kok Wey is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM), a Distinguished Fellow at the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, and a Fellow at the Malaysian Institute for Defence and Security (MiDAS).