Brokering The Cambodia-Thailand Ceasefire

By Professor Datuk Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah, Chairman of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia

What did they say about trust being like a vase, which, once broken, will never be the same again? So, do we leave it in tatters, or try to fix it back to form?

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This could well describe the state of play between Cambodia and Thailand sharing a border which has long been an unruly frontier, where old maps, national pride and political survival intersect. The trust deficit between the two considerably outweighs the cultivated goodwill, leaving no illusion that whatever peace struck on the anvil of diplomacy will be iron clad. Thus, the brokering of a ceasefire between the two following recent clashes is a reminder that diplomacy’s true measure lies not in sweeping settlements, but in holding the line against worse outcomes.

That truth was tested in late July, when tensions that began simmering in May erupted as Cambodian and Thai troops exchanged fire in disputed territory along the Dangrek mountains. Thanks to the trust shortfall, what began as a familiar border clash escalated sharply when Cambodia deployed multiple launch rocket systems that hit a hospital, among other targets, prompting Thailand to respond with F‑16 strikes, possibly the first time its air force had fired in anger since a brief border war with Laos in 1987. Tens of thousands fled to makeshift camps. The fighting was the most intense in more than a decade.

On July 28, Cambodia and Thailand agreed to halt hostilities from midnight. Meeting in Putrajaya under Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN, both leaders accepted an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. The agreement was the product of painstaking, unglamorous but by no means lacklustre facilitation by Malaysia, with the United States playing a consequential, parallel role. President Trump added urgency by warning that tariff negotiations with both countries would not proceed until “fighting stops.”

China, present as an observer, lent additional weight to the talks – particularly important for Cambodia, which counts Beijing as its most dependable backer. The optics mattered: the message was that de‑escalation was in everyone’s interest, and that Malaysia’s convening role was part of a wider diplomatic effort, not an exercise in rivalry.

Reaching the ceasefire was never a foregone conclusion as, not surprisingly, the two sides took diametrically opposed approaches to handling the dispute. Phnom Penh sought to internationalise the issue, reviving old appeals to the International Court of Justice and casting itself as the aggrieved party. Bangkok insisted on tackling it bilaterally, out of the global spotlight and far from anything that might invite international arbitration. Neither could be seen to back down.

And unlike the clash in 2011, this confrontation played out against a more tangled political backdrop. The feud between Cambodia’s strongman Hun Sen and Thailand’s Shinawatra family, once firm friends, added an edge that made compromise all the more politically fraught.

Into this maelstrom stepped Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, intent on calming the waters. He engaged both Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thailand’s Acting Prime Minister Phumtham with care, giving each space to air grievances while calibrating the optics: enough publicity to signal progress, but never so much as to box either side in. After all, wiggle room in diplomatic negotiations is an absolute necessity. By bringing the two leaders to Putrajaya, within 24 hours, and offering to coordinate observers, Malaysia showed that an ASEAN chair willing to act and quick on the draw can still shape events.

Privileged to have a front row seat to witness history unfolding on the fly the night before, seeing Anwar holding conversations with two phones synchronously with earnestness but a full dose of panache stirred Goosebumps, what more that this came the day after the much vaunted and infamous “Turun Anwar” rally.  

To be sure, the meeting in Putrajaya was as much about process as substance. The ceasefire was framed as an initial measure to halt the fighting and stabilise the situation, not even as prelude to dispute resolution.

Follow‑up arrangements rely largely on bilateral mechanisms between Cambodia and Thailand, with ASEAN in a supporting role. That was by design. A heavier ASEAN role might have triggered resentment and made the arrangement harder to sustain. But this doesn’t preclude Anwar, in his personal capacity, from doing the nudging and cajoling to both parties, more as ASEAN family members than as chair sitting in council. On the formal side, the arrangement represented a midpoint between Bangkok’s preference for bilateralism and Phnom Penh’s push for wider international involvement.

This approach rests on the will and discipline of the two parties where the animus between them makes implementation inherently fraught. The acting Thai prime minister’s commitment carries political weight, but sustaining the ceasefire will depend in part on civil–military relations in Bangkok, where the armed forces have long exercised considerable autonomy.

On the Cambodian side, Prime Minister Hun Manet faces his own constraints. Barely two years into his premiership, he cannot afford to appear weak on a matter of national pride, his political lineage notwithstanding. Domestic sentiment demands that Cambodia stand firm, leaving little room for compromise, even in the interest of stability.

All said, while the crucial role of political leaders is undeniable, a lasting pause will require more than cabinet orders. It will need continued discipline from commanders of both sides on the ground. Anwar stressed that point to members of the ASEAN diplomatic corps during an interface session in Jakarta yesterday, on the sidelines of his state visit to Indonesia.

That political reality shapes expectations of what this agreement can achieve. In the aftermath, some commentary focused on the obvious: that it did nothing to resolve the underlying dispute. But that was never the objective. Complaints that ASEAN failed to resolve the dispute swiftly miss the point entirely. There was never any prospect of conjuring fantasy settlements overnight, a standard at which no international body performs any better. The endless navel‑gazing over ASEAN’s shortcomings isn’t analysis; it’s an academic distraction from the work that still lies ahead.

For Malaysia, this is not a pursuit in vainglory. The role of ASEAN chair is designed to be facilitative, not proprietorial. The ability to plant the seeds with the prospect of future harvest for peace is reward enough. As in life, so in geopolitics, there are no absolute guarantees. ASEAN works best when the chair is willing to act, not by trying to foist solutions, but by creating the space and opportunity in which they might one day emerge.

-- BERNAMA

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of BERNAMA)